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Palestinians in the Syrian Uprising:  





At the outset of the Syrian civil war, Syria was home to 495,970  
Palestinian refugees (149,822 living in official camps),1  most of 
whom had entered, or were descended from individuals who had 
entered the country in 1948. These refugees, while not techni-
cally Syrian citizens, were closely integrated into the Syrian 
state, enjoying effectively identical rights to Syrian citizens, but 
retaining a close ideological affiliation to the Palestinian national 
cause. The Syrian regime also maintained and funded a number 
of Palestinian resistances organizations, while relating to others 
in various different ways over time.2 
When the protests that would escalate into the Syrian rev-
olution and then the Syrian civil war began in 2011, Palestinians 
living in Syria found themselves on the horns of a dilemma. On 
the one hand, they had reason to be grateful to the regime, which 
had rooted its claims to legitimacy in its staunch support for the 
Palestinian cause.3 And yet on the other, this same argument 
could also be reframed as entailing a debt of gratitude to the Syr-
ian people in their liberation struggle. On top of this, Palestinians 
needed to factor in the divergent positions taken by the key Pal-
estinian factions, the regime’s long cultivation of loyalist Pales-
tinian front groups and, of course, the self-interested question of 
which side was likely to win. 
This study seeks to shed light on how and why Palestinian 
communities in Syria arrived at the political positions they ulti-
mately did in relation to the conflict. In order to do so, it draws 
on a combination of pre-existing studies published in Arabic, in-
cluding those mentioned above, as well as the author’s own ex-
tensive direct experience as a Syrian Palestinian political 
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scientist who was present in Syria during the initial years of the 
war. During this period, the author had numerous opportunities 
to visit and spend time in several refugee camps between 2012 
and 2016, including the two discussed in detail here, as well as 
to speak to individuals involved in the events occurring there. 
(Formal fieldwork would, of course, not have been permitted to 
a Syrian academic during this period). Since then, this picture 
has been updated with informal conversations and correspond-
ences with a personal network of friends and acquaintances from 
these camps.  
Taking a case study approach, the paper seeks to compare 
and contrast the experiences of Palestinians living in two camps 
in particular: Neirab camp, which is located on the outskirts of 
Aleppo, and Daraa refugee camp, which is located some distance 
from the city after which it is named.  
 
Previous Studies  
The subject of the role played by Palestinians in the Syrian civil 
war is virtually untouched in the academic literature available in 
English, and indeed there is apparently not a great deal of mate-
rial that deals with Palestinians in Syria at all. The most compre-
hensive treatment is Neil Gabiam’s book The Politics of 
Suffering: Syria’s Palestinian Refugee Camps, which deals with 
questions of Palestinian political identity in the context of the 
urbanization of the camps.4 Similar concerns are reflected in 
other studies, such as Brand’s 1988 paper addressing the sup-
posed dilemma of “integration”,5 and Hanafi’s 2010 chapter 
which, by contrast, draws on the experience of Palestinians in 
Lebanon and Syria to critique the idea of the refugee camp it-
self.6 
In Arabic, the topic has been addressed in a significant 
number of media comment pieces and research papers. How-
ever, few of these go into any considerable depth. The overall 
situation of Palestinians in Syria is also the subject of a mono-
graph by Yousef Zidane and Yousef Fakhreddine. Published in 
2013, this provides an extensive and detailed overview of the 
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subject, including invaluable casualty figures for Palestinians in 
the conflict. However, the book’s analytical content is somewhat 
limited.7 
Professor Osama Mohammed Abu Nahal’s "The position 
of the Palestinian Authority and Hamas with regard to the Syrian 
crisis, and reflections on the future of the Palestinian cause", as 
its title suggests, is mainly concerned with the way in which the 
Syrian war impacted on the leadership of the dominant Palestin-
ian factions as opposed to the situation of Palestinians on the 
ground, (or for that matter, factions other than Fatah and Ha-
mas). More problematically, the author tends to treat the factions 
he deals with in a monolithic fashion, meaning that he does not 
take account of the important ways in which the Syrian revolu-
tionary cause placed considerable strain between the official po-
sition of the factions’ official leadership and their rank-and-file 
members.  He also, in my view, misreads the position of Hamas, 
which he believes to have been one of full engagement in the 
conflict.  
Despite these limitations, Professor Abu Nahal does 
acknowledge the inherently contradictory situation in which Pal-
estinian refugees in Syria found themselves after the outbreak of 
Syrian popular protest, given the positions taken by the major 
Palestinian factions. His ultimate conclusion is that the fall of the 
Syrian regime, for all its flaws, would at present be a disaster for 
the Palestinian cause. Whoever might assume power after it 
would be bound to return the favour to those who had supported 
it militarily, such as the United States, Turkey or other Arab 
states.   
Another significant study is "The Palestinians in Syria and 
the Syrian Revolution" by Salah Hassan of The Arab Centre for 
Research and Political Studies. This study concerns the position 
of Palestinians towards the Syrian civil war and deals with these 
positions from many different perspectives. In contrast to Abu 
Nahal’s work, then, it does to some extent consider the positions 
taken by ordinary Palestinians and the Palestinian general pub-
lic, as well as those taken by the political leadership and elites. 
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However, it is largely concerned with history and concentrates 
on the events that occurred in Yarmuk refugee camp only, with-
out considering the bigger picture of the other refugee camps, 
and the role of geographical position in relation to the key events 
of the revolution in the formation of the general mood of each 
camp in favour of one grouping or another. The study concludes 
that the Palestinians would do best to support the Syrian upris-
ing, taking into account moral and political considerations, and 
that the position of neutrality is to be rejected. He urges that 
those Palestinian factions which have fought alongside the re-
gime should be isolated.   
The Yarmuk refugee camp also appears as a case study in 
a work by Ayman Abu Hashim, appropriately titled: "The Im-
pact of the Syrian Revolution on the Palestinians of Syria – a 
Case Study of Al-Yarmouk Refugee Camp: Aspects of Interven-
tion and Interaction", focusing on how events in the camp influ-
enced the events that occurred in Syria. Unlike the studies above, 
it sets out a Palestinian perspective on what happened in the 
camps. But the study does not concern all the segments, levels 
and groupings which represent the Palestinians in general, and 
their perspective concerning the events they lived through in 
Syria.  
Finally, "The Palestinians in Syria: Between the Hammer 
of the Revolution and the Anvil of the Regime" by Tariq Aziza 
of the Centre for Palestinian Studies is an attempt to impartially 
understand the reasons that pushed Palestinians to become en-
gaged in the Syrian uprising. Aziza, however, seems to view the 
Palestinians as a homogenous group without engaging with the 
details of the Palestinian situation, or drawing distinctions be-
tween Palestinians’ many positions and alignments. It also re-
searches into the history of the relationship between Palestinians 
and the Syrian regime, reducing ‘the Palestinians’ to the Fatah 
movement This study argues that it would be in the best interest 
of Palestinians to distance themselves from the conflict and re-
frain from fighting in it to the extent possible. Indeed, neutrality, 
despite its shortcomings, is the least-worst option.  
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As this brief review shows, the material in Arabic, while 
going deeper into the subject than studies available in English, 
tends to be politically engaged and opinion based, as well as 
tending to view Palestinian political positions as indistinguisha-
ble from the official stances taken by the Palestinian political 
leadership. And yet – as I shall now explain – this is far from an 
accurate reflection of how Palestinian politics has actually 
played out for those Palestinians caught up in the Syrian conflict.   
 
Palestinians in Syria at the outset of the conflict  
In the first months of the Syrian uprising, the general sentiment 
among Syria’s Palestinians was that it was best not to get in-
volved in what was seen as a fundamentally Syrian political is-
sue. Involvement, such as it was, was limited to individuals, and 
“focused on providing relief and medical aid to those trapped in 
the hotspots and displaced persons from their rebellious neigh-
borhood, this happened in Daraa camp  and later on  in Alramel 
camp in  Lattakia and the Alaedon camp in Homs”.8  
Nevertheless, as the conflict progressed, Palestinians 
found it increasingly impossible to avoid deeper and more parti-
san involvement. This didn’t necessarily entail physical mobili-
zation into the fighting – many Palestinians supported one side 
or another but did not take up arms. Where Palestinians fought 
with the regime, they did so by means of the same structures for 
the mobilization of Palestinians that had existed before the war 
– that is to say, in specifically Palestinian units created by and 
loyal to the regime.9 Conversely, Palestinians who physically 
took up arms against the regime (which seems to have been un-
common, in contrast to those who supported the rebels ideolog-
ically) did so by joining the same rebel units as Syrians.10  
 
Possible reasons for Palestinian involvement  
Overall, five factors can be identified as plausibly significant in 
pushing Palestinians in Syria towards mobilizing on one side or 
another, namely: factional affiliation, geographical proximity, 
demographic overlap, ideological convictions and provocations, 
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in addition to, of course, material incentives and sanctions. I will 
now discuss these in turn.  
 
Factional Affiliation 
Most of the Palestinians in Syria, and elsewhere, belong to or 
support one or other of the Palestinian factions. As a result, when 
these factions mobilized on one side or the other, this inevitably 
tended to mean that they took their followers with them (alt-
hough, as we shall see, this was by no means a given). Indeed, 
differences between the positions of factional leaderships and 
rank-and-file members have put Palestinian factions under con-
siderable strain.11 The lack of unity, however, both among the 
different factions and within them, meant that there was no uni-
fied reference point for all Palestinians which might have led 
them towards a united position. The Palestinian Authority (PA) 
and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) did not deal 
with the issue of Palestinian refugees in Syria in a responsible 
manner, “and their position was inadequate and shocking and 
gave rise to complacency among Syrian Palestinians, who hoped 
that the PLO and the PA would play a greater role in protecting 
and defending them”.12 
 
Geographical Proximity 
As the battle lines of the Syrian civil war were drawn, Palestinian 
refugee camps frequently turned out to be near the hot spots of 
the conflict. This made any attempt to keep a distance from it 
literally unsustainable. As Baytari notes, for example, “Al-Yar-
mouk camp, which is the largest Palestinian camp in Syria, is 
located among the neighborhoods of Qadam, Tadamon, and al-
Hajar al-Aswad. All these neighborhoods were hot spots, and 
places where security was threatened.”13 Homs camp (Alaaedon) 
was in the same situation, being close to the Baba Amr neigh-
borhood, which was considered the area in the city of Homs 
where conflict was most intense. 
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Demographic overlap  
As a consequence of the gradual integration of Palestinians and 
their refugee camps into Syrian society, Palestinian camps have 
become home to an increasing population of Syrians, living side 
by side with Palestinian neighbours. The Yarmuk camp, for ex-
ample, has a mixed population of Syrians and Palestinians. On 
the other hand, many Palestinians live in Syrian cities alongside 
native Syrian people. Many Palestinians, for example, lived in 
the city of Aleppo, far from their camps (Neirab and  Ein Al-
Tal). According to Badwan, as many as 29% of Palestinian ref-
ugees reside within cities in Syria.14 
 
Ideological convictions  
For Palestinians in Syria in general, partisan involvement was a 
particularly agonizing step precisely because there was no single 
political narrative which clearly favoured either the rebel or re-
gime sides. Nevertheless, many individual Palestinians devel-
oped strong convictions based on their reading of Palestinian 
history in Syria.  
Palestinians who opposed the regime believed that they 
were obligated to the Syrian people for their hospitality since the 
Nakba when they had been forced to flee to Syria. The Syrian 
people had received the Palestinians and given them equal 
rights,15 living side by side with them for many decades. There-
fore – so the view went – it was not reasonable for Palestinians 
to see their Syrian brethren suffering from injustice and oppres-
sion without any solidarity and sympathy in their desire to obtain 
their freedom; the freedom that has long been a slogan echoed 
by the Palestinians since the Nakba.   
They also recalled the history of the regime's injustice and 
brutality against the Palestinians, both in general, and with spe-
cific regard to Palestinians in Syria. These grievances included 
Syrian governmental actions in the Lebanese civil war such as 
that Tel Za'tar massacre in 1976 and the siege of the Palestinian 
camps in Lebanon. They also included the programme of arrests 
that was carried out by the regime after its conflict with Yasser 
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Arafat in 1983. Another key memory was of the special "Pales-
tinian branch" of the security forces, as well as the regime's at-
tempts to split the Palestinian factions, as happened within the 
Fatah movement in 1983. Indeed, there was a long list of painful 
incidents still deeply rooted in the minds of many Palestinians, 
which caused them to welcome the prospective fall of the re-
gime.  
On the other hand, there were Palestinian refugees who 
supported the regime. They believed in the regime's narrative 
that there was a global conspiracy against Syria and that they had 
proof to justify this position. For example, the countries which 
demanded that Bashar Al-Assad should step down were the 
same countries that had historically been hostile to the Palestin-
ian cause, or had never supported it, whether they were Arab 
countries, such as the Gulf states, or international powers, such 
as the United States and the members of the European Union. 
They believed that the aim of the war was to weaken the axis of 
resistance and to overthrow the Syrian regime, which had been 
supporting the Palestinian cause over the past decades and had 
been embracing the rebel factions. They also recalled past his-
tory to justify their points of view, invoking, for example, the 
1973 October War, and the support they provided to repel the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon, during which hundreds of Syrian 
soldiers were killed. 
This point of view is neatly encapsulated by Palestinian 
researcher Muhammad Abu Nahal: “If the Syrian regime falls, 
the Palestinians will be lost as a people (not as a leadership) and 
their strategic allies in the region and the world will also be lost. 
They will also lose the political, military and moral support that 
they have been provided with from regional and international al-
lies."16 
These Palestinians also believed – in a reformulation of the 
argument put forward by anti-regime Palestinians – that they 
owed the Syrian regime their support because of the laws which 
put them on a par with their Syrian brethren. The laws were is-
sued before the Arab Baath Socialist Party came to power (thus 
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before Assad took power) but remained under the new govern-
ment. The fact that these decrees were still in force without any 
changes was a source of gratitude for Palestinians. They com-
pared their situation with the situation of Palestinian refugees in 
neighboring countries, where they  lived under difficult condi-
tions.17 It is also worth noting that Palestinians who took this 
position were generally taking a stance that was in line with the 
official one adopted by the key Palestinian factions, who be-
lieved that  the alternative to the regime was linked to external 
agendas hostile to their cause. Additionally, there is no doubt 
that a few Palestinians based their position on personal interests, 
some seeking to preserve privileges granted by the regime, while 
others derived benefits from the existence of the regime. 
 
Provocations 
While ideological convictions and contingent factors on their 
own might well have ultimately driven Palestinians to mobilise, 
this process was almost certainly hastened in some cases by pro-
vocative actions by the regime (and, in some instances, by Syrian 
rebels). At least in the view of Palestinians with pre-existing re-
bel sympathies, there was a clear policy by the regime from early 
on to try to inflame tensions between Palestinians and (pro-re-
gime) Syrians by spreading propaganda that Palestinians were 
behind the riots which took place in some Syrian cities, such as 
Daraa and Latakia. The Syrian newspaper, Al-Watan, which is 
close to the regime, made an accusation in its issue dated 22 
March 2011 that some of the Palestinian refugees were behind 
what was going on in Daraa. Later on, Buthaina Shaaban, polit-
ical and media adviser to the Syrian president, accused a group 
of Palestinians in the Alramel camp of being behind the "sedi-
tion" in Latakia when, on 27 March 2011, she claimed that 
“some of the Palestinian brothers attacked and damaged the 
shops in Latakia city and initiated sedition in the community".18 
Later on, this accusation moved from mere media hype to 
reality when some Palestinian camps witnessed incidents which 
were indeed a turning point, bringing about the realization that 
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the regime was using violence against peaceful demonstrations. 
The most important incident, which was known as "the second 
return march", or "Al-Kalesa events", on 6 June 2011, occurred 
when members of the regime loyalist Popular Front General 
Command fired on the funeral of the martyrs of the second "re-
turn march", leading to a number of deaths and dozens of injuries 
among the young mourners.  
A second major turning-point for the Palestinians, in Syria 
in general and the camps in particular, came in mid-August 
2011, when the Syrian army bombed Alramel camp which is lo-
cated on the city’s outskirts. About five thousand Palestinians 
fled the camp under fire in the course of a major crackdown on 
protestors in Latakiya."19 
The assassination of a number of officers of the Palestine 
Liberation Army, because they refused to involve the Liberation 
Army in the fighting, was new proof in confirming to some Pal-
estinians that the regime was trying to drag them into the furnace 
of the conflict.20 
From the point of view of the party which was against the 
regime, the demonstrations which took place in most Syrian cit-
ies were peaceful for the first few months21, as President Bashar 
al-Assad had said, and therefore the problem lay in the regime's 
unwillingness to reform and their using of the security forces to 
abort popular mobilization. 
Daraa and Neirab: A View from the Camps 
Having outlined the general factors behind Palestinian mobiliza-
tion in the Syrian conflict, I will now seek to explore the question 
in more depth by focusing on the specific cases of two Palestin-
ian refugee camps in Syria: Daraa and Neirab. These cases pre-
sent an interesting contrast because of the opposite sides they 
ended up on: broadly speaking, Daraa adopted a strongly anti-
regime position, whereas Neirab did not.  
Daraa refugee camp was originally founded in 1950. A 
new camp was created immediately next to the first one in 1967 
to accommodate new refugees from the Six Days’ War, 
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including Syrians displaced from the Golan Heights. The camp 
is located immediately to the east of the city of Daraa and, as is 
usual with Palestinian refugee camps in Syria, can now effec-
tively be considered an integral part of the Daraa metropolitan 
area, with the population consisting of a mixture between the 
original Palestinian inhabitants and some with Syrian national 
status. The total population of the camp is 13,000.22  
Neirab camp, with a population of 19,000,23 is located in a 
mostly rural area 16 kilometers to the east of Aleppo, meaning 
that it constitutes what is in effect an independent township. It 
was founded between 1948 and 1950, meaning that most of its 
inhabitants are Palestinian refugees from this period.  
Historical and geographical factors mean that, immedi-
ately prior to the outbreak of the Syrian conflict, the two camps 
differed somewhat in terms of the make-up of their respective 
populations. The camps also differed somewhat from a socio-
economic point of view. Daraa camp – like the city in which it 
is located – depended largely on the agricultural industry. Nei-
rab’s economy was more dependent on education and, ulti-
mately, on UNRWA institutions.  
From a political point of view however, there is little rea-
son to believe that the two camps were unalike. In common with 
most Palestinian refugee camps immediately prior to the out-
break of hostilities, political affiliations approximated to those 
in Palestine itself with a roughly equal balance between support-
ers of Hamas and of Fatah. Despite the existence of several 
groups closely aligned with the Syrian regime, such as Saiqa, 
Fatah al-Intifada and the PFLP-GC, these groups have enjoyed 
only limited popular allegiance in Syria as elsewhere.  
In what follows I present a necessarily simplified account 
of how overall sentiment in these places changed over the course 
of the war. Naturally, opinion in neither camp was monolithic 
during the period with which I am concerned. Nevertheless, it is 
meaningful to speak of a general shift in the prevailing opinions 
in both cases. As I argue, these attitudes were primarily deter-
mined by the question of which side caused damage to the camp 
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and its inhabitants (such as destruction, killings, arrests, siege, 
shelling). Here, the geographical location of the camp and its 
importance to the conflicting parties played the most significant 
role in the course of events and facts. 
Given that the Syrian civil war originally escalated from 
the protests that began in Daraa in March 2011, it is unsurprising 
that Daraa refugee camp was embroiled in the conflict from its 
outset. In the early months, inhabitants of the camp assisted Syr-
ian demonstrators by providing humanitarian relief. Soon, the 
camp was also serving as a refuge for those wanted by regime 
forces. As an article in Al-Araby put it, this “made the camp a 
target, especially as the camp is located between Daraa al-Ma-
hatta and the Syrian displaced camp, making it a mandatory 
channel for the regime's forces to suppress protesters in the dis-
placed camp or in the area around the dam”.24 As early as 23 
March, Daraa camp had produced its first Palestinian martyr, 
Wissam Amin al-Ghoul, who was killed by Syrian security 
forces after he tried to transfer two injured Syrians to the camp’s 
hospital. 25  
A direct consequence of these acts of solidarity was to 
place the camp itself directly in the firing line. According to the 
media activist Ayham al-Said, “Most of the camp's Palestinian 
refugee inhabitants were displaced as a result of the barbaric 
shelling of the camp by the Syrian regime”.26 By June 2017, the 
number of casualties had reached 370, with the addition of 68 
political detainees.27 Additionally, the Working Group for Pal-
estinian-Syrians confirmed that about 80% of the camp was de-
stroyed. The regime had arrested and killed a significant number 
of the camp’s inhabitants.28 
Neirab camp offers a different and contrasting story. The 
camp is located in close proximity to Neirab Military Airport, to 
the headquarters of the 80th Brigade of the Syrian Army which 
was charged with defending the air base, and to Aleppo Interna-
tional Airport. It was, therefore, a place of key strategic im-
portance for both regime and opposition forces.  
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As a consequence of this, the camp experienced significant 
violence early on in the conflict from opposition forces. On 11 
July 2012, a rebel militia kidnapped and executed fourteen mem-
bers of the Palestinian Liberation Army faction while they were 
returning from Musayef to Aleppo. This was despite the fact that 
the Palestinian Liberation Army had not yet adopted a clear po-
sition in support of the regime. The situation further escalated in 
2013, when opposition militants besieged the camp, blocking ac-
cess to essential commodities and causing considerable hardship 
to the inhabitants – especially children.29 This was in addition to 
deaths, injuries and destruction of houses and shops caused when 
the camp was shelled.30 This hostility has continued. As recently 
as May 2019, the camp was again shelled by opposition forces 
who killed ten people, including children and elderly people.  
By contrast, the camp saw comparatively little repression 
from the regime. While a number of the camp’s inhabitants were 
arrested, some of whom were subjected to torture, the regime did 
not launch indiscriminate violent attacks on the camp of the kind 
seen in Daraa and other Palestinian camps.  
Ultimately, Neirab camp became characterized by an atti-
tude of popular outrage against the opposition factions, which 
helped to provide a pretext for the regime and its supporters in 
the camp to form a military force supporting the regime, known 
as  the Jerusalem Brigade.31 There is some reason to believe that 
a self-reinforcing dynamic ultimately emerged between Neirab’s 
reputation for regime loyalism and the regime’s own politics to-
wards the camp. As one former inhabitant of the camp noted, as 
the conflict progressed, there was a widely held belief that re-
gime security forces displayed preferential treatment towards in-
habitants of the camp on the basis of their presumed loyalty.  
To summarise, according to the Palestinian Working 
Group for Syria, as of 2011, the number of Palestinian refugees 
who were killed in Daraa camp is 41332, most of them by the 
regime33, while the number of Palestinian refugees who were 
killed in Neirab camp is 183, most of them by armed opposition 
groups.  According to UNRWA statistics, the population of the 
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Neirab camp is about 19,000, while the population of the Daraa 
camp is 13,000, meaning that in proportional terms, the regime 
violence against Daraa was more severe than that of rebel groups 
against Neirab.  
 
Discussion   
As the cases of Daraa and Neirab indicate, Palestinian mobiliza-
tion in the Syrian civil war was closely bound up with contingent 
factors and dynamics on the ground. This is not to say that ideo-
logical and pre-existing structural variables, such as the five fac-
tors outlined earlier, were irrelevant – indeed we can see all of 
them at play in one way or another in the cases. Demographic 
overlap was clearly important in helping to account for the ra-
pidity with which the Palestinians of Daraa became entangled in 
the fate of their neighbours. Geographical proximity was also 
important – and arguably was even more so in shaping the fate 
of Neirab. These factors, in turn, opened the camps to provoca-
tive attacks from the regime in the case of Daraa, and rebel forces 
in the case of Neirab, which represented the most immediately 
proximate cause of their political alignment. It is worth noting 
that it was apparently not simply repression on its own that was 
key here, but rather the experience of indiscriminate repression. 
The two factors that seem to have been least relevant were pre-
existing factional loyalty and ideological affiliation, although 
these were not necessarily entirely irrelevant. As we have seen 
in the case of Neirab, the fact that Palestinian paramilitary 
groups that had been allowed to operate in Syria were typically 
closely linked to the regime seems to have predisposed some 
Syrian rebel groups towards an early hostile stand against them. 
This, in turn, was an important factor in tipping the alignment of 
the camp in favour of the regime. Nevertheless, there is little rea-
son to think that Daraa’s ideological and factional make-up at 
the outset of the Syrian conflict was radically different to that of 
Neirab.  
As civil war scholar Stathis Kalyvas has observed, mobi-
lization in civil wars is often understood as ideologically 
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motivated and based upon political alignments that preceded it, 
and largely account for the dynamics of the subsequent vio-
lence.34 In line with other studies examining “micro-level” dy-
namics of violent conflict,35 the case of the Palestinians in Syria 
helps to challenge such assumptions. There is little reason to be-
lieve that, at the outset of the Syrian civil war, Daraa and Neirab 
camps differed to any significant degree in the political sympa-
thies and affiliations of their inhabitants. Nonetheless, over the 
course of the war, they ended up – as we have seen – taking di-
ametrically opposed positions. Despite the many potential ideo-
logical and social factors that could have accounted for 
Palestinian partisanship in the conflict, it appears that both con-
tingent and arbitrary events are largely accountable for the actual 
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